

## Message Text

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SUBJECT: REINFORCED NAC SESSION ON SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE

EAST, NOVEMBER 20, 1974

SUMMARY: REINFORCED NAC MEETING OF NOVEMBER 20 WAS ATTENDED BY SENIOR MIDDLE EAST OFFICIALS FROM THE U.S. (ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON), UK (ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY WEIR), NETHERLANDS (DIRECTOR, AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST, MR. VAN DER KUN), ITALY(MR. AOLICO) AND FRG (COORDINATOR OF ARAB AFFAIRS, AMBASSADOR SCHIRMER). THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED ABOUT TWO AND ONE HALFHOURS, BEGAN WITH A PRESENTATION BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON, FOCUSSED IN PARTICULAR ON SECRETARY KISSINGER'S RECENT MIDDLE EAST TRIP.

ATHERTON REVIEWED BRIEFLY CONSULTATIONS SECRETARY HAD HELD DURING

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SUMMER AND IN OCTOBER TRIP TO AREA TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR GETTING NEXT STAGE OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED. AS SECRETARY SAID TO NATO AMBASSADORS IN MID-OCTOBER, OUR HOPE WAS THAT HIS NOVEMBER

TRIP--AFTER ARABS HAD DEALT WITH PLO/JORDAN PROBLEM AT RABAT SUMMIT--WOULD ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON MODALITIES AND SOME IDEAS ON SUBSTANCE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. RABAT SUMMIT DECISION TO ENDORSE PLO AND EXCLUDE JORDAN FROM WEST BANK NEGOTIATION, HOWEVER,HAD CREATED NEW SITUATION, NOT ONLY MAKING ANY WEST BANK NEGOTIATION IMPOSSIBLE BUT ALSO RAISING DOUBTS IN ISRAEL ABOUT ULTIMATE INTENTIONS OF PRINCIPAL ARAB NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. NEGOTIATING SITUATION WAS NOW MORE COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT-- A JUDGMENT SECRETARY HAD STRESSED IN HIS TALKS WITH AREA LEADERS DURING NOVEMBER TRIP. HE HAD URGED ALL CONCERNED TO REFLECT ON NEW SITUATION, AND ALL HAD AGREED WE WOULD RESUME DISCUSSIONS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS STARTED FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY DECEMBER.

ATHERTON SAID QUESTION OF GETTING NEGOTIATORS GOING AGAIN NOW HANGS IN THE BALANCE WITH CURRENT UNGA DEBATE AND QUESTION OF UNDOF RENEWAL MAJOR FACTORS IN OUTCOME. AS RESULT OF SECRETARY'S NOVEMBER TRIP, HOWEVER, PARTIES HAD INDICATED DESIRE FOR U.S. TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, AND WE BELIEVED DOOR WAS STILL OPEN. WE WERE CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL, IF PARTIES WOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF REALITIES OF WHAT WAS POSSIBLE IN NEXT STAGE. ON SOVIET ROLE, ATHERTON SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE SOVIETS HAD TRIED OBSTRUCT U.S. NEGOTIATING EFFORTS, ALTHOUGH THEY OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE MORE ACTIVE ROLE AND EARLY RETURN TO GENEVA. FOR OUR PART, WE PREPARED TO SEE RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONFERENCE WHEN ALL PARTIES AGREED TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WERE RIGHTS, BUT FELT PREMATURE RETURN TO GENEVA-- PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT RABLAT DECISIONS AND UNGA DEBATE--WOULD CREATE INSTANT STALEMATE OVER PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE.

ALL REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE VISITING OFFICIALS. CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION WAS FOCUSED ON THE CURRENT UN DEBATE ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEING CONSIDERED AT THE UNGA. DE ROSE (FRANCE), WEIR AND VAN DER KUN ALL REFERRED TO RECENT EC-9 FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS QUESTION AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE EC-ARAB DIALOGUE. THEY

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REPORTED THE POSITION OF THE NINE THAT THE CURRENT UN DRAFT RESOLUTION IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE SINCE IT DOES NOT REDCOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THEY ALSO INDICATED STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT

THE CONCEPT OF PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE EC-ARAB DISCUSSIONS OR AS AN OBSERVER AT UN ORGANIZATIONS. VAN DER KUN URGED THAT THE ALLIES REJECT OUTRIGHT THE UNGA DRAFT RESOLUTION AND AVOID

TRYING TO AMEND IT.

VISITING OFFICIALS AND PERMREPS WHO SPOKE AGREED THAT A FAILURE TO RENEW THE MANDATE OF THE UNDOF COULD LEAD TO A BREAD-

DOWN IN THE CEASE FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. WHILE

AGREEING WITH THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT THUS FAR

INTERFERED WITH U.S. EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SEVERAL SPEAKERS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS  
CONCERNING FUTURE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE US. ROLE.

OVER ALL, FOLLOWING IMPRESSIONS EMERGED FROM STATEMENTS BY  
OTHER ALLIES: (1)STRONG SUPPORT FOR STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AND  
CONTINUATION OF USG EFFORTS, COUPLED WITH REPEATED EXPRESSIONS  
OF APPRECIATION FOR SECRETARY'S ROLE; (2) UNIVERSAL UNHAPPINESS  
WITH COURSE OF UNGA PALESTINE DEBATE AND ONE-SIDED ARAB RESOLUTION;  
(3) PESSIMISM ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR GETTING NEW ROND OF  
NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AND AVOIDING RENEWAL OF HOSTLITIES, WITH  
PARTICULAR CONCERN THAT ISRAEL MAY LAUNCH PREEMPTIVE ATTACK IN  
LIGHT OF QUESTIONS RABAT AND UNGADEBATE HAVE RAISED ABOUT ARAB  
ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST; (4) FEELING THAT ISRAEL  
MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO AVOID PRESENT DANGEROUS SITATI  
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INFLEXIBILITY ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION AND UNWILLINGNESS TO  
RECOGNIZE REALITIES OF PALESTINIAN FACTOR; (5) SKEPTICISM ABOUT  
SADAT'S ABILITY TO RETAIN CONTROL OF SITUATION ON ARAB SIDE AND  
GO IT ALONE AGAINST SYRIAN AND OTHER ARAB OPPOSITION; (6) SUSPICION  
OF SOVIET INTENTIONS; AND (7) ABSENCE OF ANY PROPOSALS ABOUT  
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE BEYOND URGING USG (WITHOUT GREAT HOPE OF  
SUCCESS) TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS AND (IN CASE OF DUTCH AND FEW  
OTHER REPRESENTATIVES) INDICATING IT WAS TIME TO PUT LIMITS ON  
GROUNDSWELL OF SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF PLO.

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PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY WAS ABSENCE OF ANY EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO  
ENERGY QUESTION OR ARAB OIL POLICY, OTHER THAN PASSING EXPRESSION  
OF CONCERN BY GREEK REPRESENTATIVE THAT OIL WEAPON MIGHT BE  
USED IN SUPPORT OF PAESTINIAN CAUSE AS WELL AS OF ARAB  
GOVERNMENTS' TERRITORIAL POSITIONS.

SYG LUNS, WHO WAS PARTICULARLY OUTSPOKEN IN BOTH HIS  
PESSIMISM AND HIS CRITICISM OF ARAB UNGA RESOLUTION OF PALESTINE  
ISSUE, (CLOSED SESSION BY REITERATING REMARKS OF ALL THANKING  
SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EXPRESEEING THE HOPE OF CONTINUING SUCCESS  
FOR HIS FURTHER EFFORTSM END SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS OPENED DISCUSSION BY RECALLING THAT  
MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN NAC ON OCTOBER 9.

IT WAS DECIDED THAT IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AGAIN. SYG STRESSED  
THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD, NOT WITH VIEW TO DEFINE COMMON  
MIDDLE EAST POLICY BUT AS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON POLICIES OF

THE ALLIES IN AREA. HE SAID THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE IS NECESSARY TO AVOID POSSIBLE CONFLICTING ACTIONS. SUCH CONFLICT, WE WARNED, COULD CREATE DELICATE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE WHOLE ALLIANCE.

2. SYG SAID THERE HAS BEEN MANY CHANGES SINCE LAST MONTHS NAC SESSION, INCLUDING TRIPS TO MIDDLE EAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUE, THE RABAT SUMMIT MEETING OF ARAB STATES AND MR. ARAFAT'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN AN ASIDE, LUNS WONDERED IF THAT SPEECH HAD REALLY FURTHERED THE CAUSE OF NEGOTIATIONS AS SOME HAD HOPED IN OCTOBER. HE POINTED OUT THAT AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AT THIS TIME IS ESPECIALLY NECESSARY BECAUSE THAT POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED FIGHTING SEEMS CLOSER. HE SAID ANY RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD INEVITABLY EFFECT THE STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POSITIONS OF THE ALLIES.

E. LUNS WELCOMED THE HIGH-LEVEL EXPERTS ATTENDING THE NAC: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR., (US), ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY M.S. WEIR (UK), MR. BARTOLOMEO ATOLICO (ITALY), AMBASSADOR HANS SCHIRMER (FRG) AND DR. G. VAN DER KUN (NETHERLANDS).

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4. CHARGE MCAULIFFE (U.S.) NOTED THAT SEVERAL DELEGATIONS WERE REPRESENTED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS. THE U.S. VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THEIR PRESENCE IN VIEW OF THE HEAVY DEMANDS ON THEIR TIME ENGENDERED BY THE PRESENT ACTIVE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, BOTH IN THE AREA AND IN NEW YORK. MCAULIFFE THEN INTRODUCED ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON WOULD OPEN THE DISCUSSION WITH A RUN DOWN ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AS VIEWED BY THE U.S. WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

5. MCAULIFFE STRESSED THAT U.S. DOES NOT VIEW THIS NAC SESSION AS A "BRIEFING" BUT RATHER AS A "REINFORCED" NAC SESSION DESIGNED TO FACILITATE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. U.S. DELEGATION THEREFORE LOOKED FORWARD TO CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS DURING THE SESSION.

6. ATHERTON REITERATED THAT HE ALSO LOOKED FORWARD TO SHARING VIEWS OF OTHERS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HE SAID HE WOULD REVIEW EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS, GIVE A U.S. ANALYSIS OF THESE EVENTS, DESCRIBE U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, PARTICULARLY STEMMING FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIPS IN THE AREA, AND CONCLUDE WITH A LOOK AT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. ATHERTON SAID THE U.S. HAD A VERY BUSY SUMMER WITH THE CONSULTATIONS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER. THESE CONSULTATIONS CONTINUED WITH TWO TRIPS IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS WAS TO DETERMINE HOW NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE STRUCTURED AND STARTED. THE INTENTION WAS NOT TO ACHIEVE

AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC PLANS OR PROPOSALS, BUT ONLY AN AGREEMENT ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON SAID THE U.S. HAD TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED SEVERAL OPTIONS DURING THE SUMMER'S CONSULTATIONS.

ONE HAD BEEN TO SEEK ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON THE SINAI FRONT. ANOTHER WAS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ON THE ISSUE OF WEST BANK. A THIRD WAS A POSSIBLE COMBINATION OF THESE TWO OPTIONS. THE U.S. ALSO HAD IN MIND THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, RECOGNIZING THAT EVENTUALLY ALL FRONTS WOULD HAVE TO BE SETTLED; HOWEVER, THERE HAD SEEMED LESS CHANCE OF SIGNIFICANT EARLY PROGRESS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. ATHERTON DESCRIBED U.S. STRATEGY AS A VIEW THAT PROGRESS

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ON ANY ONE OF THESE FRONTS COULD BUILD MOMENTUM LEADING TO WIDER NEGOTIATIONS.

8. ATHERTON SAID WE HAD RECOGNIZED THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST EVENTUALLY BE MET. IT WAS CLEAR AT TIME OF CONSULTATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARAB NATIONS NEEDED TIME TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO WHO WOULD REPRESENT PALESTINIANS AND WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE A WEST BANK AGREEMENT. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL NEEDED TIME TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION INTERNALLY.

9. THE PRINCIPAL U.S. MESSAGE TO BOTH SIDES DURING THE SUMMER AND THROUGH OCTOBER WAS THAT EACH PARTY MUST SEEK TO DEVELOP NEGOTIATING POSITIONS THAT WOULD MEET THE REAL NEEDS OF THE OTHER PARTIES. ISRAEL MUST RECOGNIZE ARAB REQUIREMENT TO SEEK ADDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. CONVERSELY, THE ARAB STATES MUST RECOGNIZE THE NEED OF ISRAEL FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS EVENTUALLY TO LEAD TO A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT.

10. ATHERTON SAID THE U.S. HAD URGED THE ARABS NOT TO EXCLUDE JORDAN FROM NEGOTIATIONS, AND ALSO TO LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEXT STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE U.S. DID NOT PUT FORWARD ACTUAL PLANS OR PROGRAMS, BUT FOCUSED ON MODALITIES. ATHERTON THOUGHT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD LED TO A REALIZATION BY ALL PARTIES OF THEIR NEED TO FURTHER DEFINE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.

11. ATHERTON SAID THE OCTOBER TRIP HAD APPEARED NECESSARY TO SLOW A DETERIORATING TREND. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID IN BRIEFING NATO AMBASSADORS IN MID-OCTOBER, THE U.S. HAD HOPED A SUBSEQUENT TRIP IN NOVEMBER WOULD LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT ON MODALITIES AND SOME IDEAS ON SUBSTANCE OF THE NEXT STEPS IN NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, IN OCTOBER IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ARAB NATIONS WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO THEIR RABAT SUMMIT MEETING AND WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THIS MEETING TO REFINE THEIR POSITIONS.

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12. DURING THE NOVEMBER TRIP IT BECAME CLEAR THAT EXISTING CONDITIONS HAD BEEN CHANGED BY THE DECISION OF THE RABAT GROUP TO EXCLUDE HUSAYN FROM WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON SIAD THIS GREATLY COMPLICATES NEGOTIATIONS, IN EFFECT RULING OUT HOPE

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OF REAL PROGRESS IN THE WEST BANK.ISRAEL IS NOT PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION(PLO). EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN SUPPORT OF THE PLO ON RABAT ALSO RAISED DOUBTS IN ISRAEL ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. THE PURPOSE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NOVEMBER TRIP HAD TO BE MODIFIED TO MEET THE CHANGE IN SITUATION.

13. ATHERTON SAID THE U.S. USED THE NOVEMBER TRIP TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE ARABS THE U.S. JUDGMENT THAT T E RABAT SUMMIT DECISION WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. ALSO MADE CLEAR TO ARABS THAT IT PREPARED TO PLAY A CONTINUING ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED THAT ALL PARTIES STILL WANT THE U.S.TO CONTINUE SUCH EFFORTS. ATHERTON DESCRIBED THE TRIP AS SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING REAFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR A U.S. ROLE AND IN KEEPING THE NEGOTIATING DOOR OPEN,PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THE DOOR WAS STILL OPEN AND SUPPORTING THE U.S. ROLE AT THE END OF THE VISIT. IN ADDITION THE LATE FOREIGN MINISTER SAQQAF OF SAUDI ARABIA ALSO PUBLICLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH.

14. IT WAS CLEAR AT THE END OF THE NOVEMBER TRIP THAT TIME WAS NEEDED TO ABSORB AND DIGEST THE NEW CONDITIONS, INCLUDING PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, THAT HAD BEEN CREATED BY ACTIONS TAKEN AT THE RABAT SUMMIT MEETING. THE U.S. HOPES TO RESUME CONSULTATIONS EARLY IN DECEMBER AFTER SECRETARY KISSINGER RETURNS FROM THE FAR EAST. THE U.S. HOPES THAT WHEN DISCUSSIONS RESUME IN DECEMBER, THEY WILL FOCUS ON HOW T E PARTIES WANT TO PROCEED.

15. ATHERTON STATED THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS. FIRST IS WHETHER THE ARABS WILL CONTINUE O ADHER TO A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH RATHER THAN TO DEMAND AN "ALL OR NOTHING" APPROACH. THE U.S. FEELS THAT THE LATTER POSITION WOULD BE A FORMULA FOR INSTAN STALMATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

16. IF A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH CONTINUES TO BE ACCEPTABLE, THE SECOND QUESTION IS WHETHER THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS, I.E., SHOULD ISRAEL NEGOTIATE WITH ONE ARAB PART AND THEN WITH ANOTHER, OR SHOULD ISRAEL CARRY ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH MORE THAN ONE ARAB PARTY AT ONE TIME. A THIRD QUESTION CONCERNS THE IMPACT ON NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS OF THE DECISION

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TAKEN AT THE RABAT SUMMIT MEETING AND OF THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN SAID IN THE CURRENT UNGA SESSION IN NEW YORK. RELATED TO THIS IS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MODERATES IN ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FACE OF THE NEGATIVE IMPACT IN ISRAEL OF RABAT AND THE UNGA DEBATE.

17. THE U.S. JUDGMENT IS THAT THE QUESTION OF STARTING ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IS STILL VERY MUCH IN THE BALANCE. THE U.S. CAUTIOUSLY IS HOPEFUL THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE STARTED; IT IS CLEAR THAT UNLESS MOMENTUM CONTINUES, THERE IS A RISK THAT PROGRESS ALREADY MADE WILL BE LOST.

18. AT ERTON SAID THE ANSWER WILL BE IMPORTANTLY AFFECTED BY TWO PRIMARY ISSUES BEFORE THE UN REGARDING THE DEBATE ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION, ATHERTON SAID HE COULD NOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THAT IF THE OUTCOME SHOULD LEAVE ANY AMBIGUITY REGARDING THE COMMITMENT OF THE ARAB STATES TO RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, IT WILL NOT ONLY BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS BUT RISK LOSING A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED. HE DESCRIBED THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE THUS FAR AND THE CONTENT OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION NOW FLOATING IN THE UN AS NOT VERY ENCOURAGING. THE SECOND MAJOR ISSUE IS RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF). WHILE HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WOULD BE RENEWED, ATHERTON BELIEVES THAT FAILURE TO RENEW UNDOF'S MANDATE WILL BAR PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS AND THREATEN THE PRESENT GOLAN HEIGHTS DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.

19. IN OPENING HIS COMMENTS ON THE ROLE AND ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET UNION, ATHERTON SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THE ALLIES'

VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. AS SECRETARY DISSINGER HAD SAID BEFORE, AND AS ATHERTON WISHED TO UNDERLINE, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO OBSTRUCT U.S. EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE OF COURSE INTERESTED IN RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND IN STRENGTHENING THEIR POSITION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES. UP TO NOW, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN BIDDING THEIR TIME ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNHAPPY IF U.S. EFFORTS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED PEACE FAILED. BUT, HE REPEATED, THERE WAS NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO UNDERMINE U.S. EFFORTS TO REACH

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A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

20. WITH REGARD TO U.S. ATTITUDES ON THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, ATHERTON POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ALREADY TO RETURN TO THAT NEGOTIATING FORUM WHEN THE PARTIES AGREE THE TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES ARE RIGHT. IF AN ATTEMPT WERE MADE TO RESUME THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TOO EARLY, PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE

OVER THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AND THERE WOULD BE INSTANT STALEMATE.

21. IN SUMMARIZING HIS PRESENTATION, ATHERTON NOTED THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOW PRESENTED A MOMENT OF CHOICE FOR EVERYONE--FOR THE ARABS, FOR THE ISRAELIS, AND FOR ALL OTHER COUNTRIES WHO HAVE A STAKE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WHILE SOME MOMENTS OF CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITIES HAD TOO OFTEN BEEN MISSED IN THE PAST, OTHERS HAD BEEN SEIZED AND TURNED TO CONSTRUCTIVE USE AS DEVELOPMENTS FROM OCTOBER 1973 TO MAY 1974 HAVE INDICATED. HE DID NOT WANT TO SAY THAT PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES WOULD NOT BE SEIZED. THE SITUATION IS DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX, BUT NOW WITHOUT HOPE. THE U.S. HOPED THAT RESPONSIBLE LEADERS IN THE AREA WOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE REALITIES. IN ANY EVENT, THE UNITED STATES WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO FOSTER A PEACEFUL OUTCOME

22. SYG LUNS THANKED ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FOR HIS EXCELLENT REPORT, EVEN THOUGH CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT PERMIT A VERY OPTIMISTIC ONE.

23. TURKISH PERMREP (ERALP) NOTING THAT HE REPRESENTED A COUNTRY IN THE AREA, (3/043 3\$ #8 034 9,-) 5#-( 59 .4. ATHERTON AND HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR SECRETARY DISSINGERS "EXCELLENT" EFFORTS TO BRING A STABLE PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. OBSERVING THAT TURKEY HAD SOME 800 KM OF COMMON FRONTIER WITH SYRIA, ERALP SAID THAT ANKARA WAS VITALLY INTERESTED IN A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE UK PAPER, CIRCULATED TO NATO DELEGATIONS ON NOVEMBER 19 (SEE SEPTEL), WAS AN INTERESTING AND ACCURATE  
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REFLECTION OF THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. ERALP NOTED THAT THE UK PAPER IDENTIFIED AS VITAL THE QUESTION OF RENEWAL OF THE UNDOF MANDATE. IF UNDOF WERE WITHDRAWN, EITHER SIDE MIGHT BE INCLINED TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK. ERALP NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER RECENTLY STATED THAT IF SYRIA REJECTED RENEWAL OF THE UNDOF, THE ISRAELIS WOULD CONSIDER THIS A CAUSUS BELLI. ERALP NOTED THAT THIS STATEMENT SMACKED OF THOSE MADE ABOUT SHARM-EL-SHEIKH WHICH HELPED PRECIPITATE THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.

24. WITH REGARD TO THE PLO, ERALP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AT ONE POINT ARAAFAT AND KING HUSAYN HAD AGREED TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PLO'S SECOND IN COMMAND NOW SAID THAT THE ORGANIZATION WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE JORDAN. ERALP TOOK THIS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE PLO HAD TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS ON THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN.

25. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE CONFLICTING DEVELOPMENTS AND ATTITUDES, ERALP SAID HIS GOVERNMENT STILL HOPED FOR THE



SUCCESS OF THE SECRETARYS STEP BY STEP APPROACH TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE FEARED, HOWEVER, THAT T IS APPROACH MIGHT FOUNDER ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM GIVEN THE ACTIVE MOSLEM, CHRISTIAN, JEWISH INTERESTS IN THAT ISSUE. ERALP SUGGESTED THAT "WE ALL" MUST URGE THE ISRAELIS TO BE CONCILIATORY ON THE JERUSALEM QUESTION.

26. COUNCIL DEAN DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) THANKED THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS VALUABLE CONSULTATION. HE NOTED THAT ANY MIDDLE EAST ANALYSIS MUST BE BASED LARGELY ON CONJECTURE WHICH MIGHT THEN BE DENIED BY THE NEXT DAYS EVENTS. THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE UK PAPER. BELGIUM BELIEVED THAT THE SECRETARYS STEP BY STEP APPROACH WAS THE BEST HOPE FOR A MIDDLE EAST PEACE. SINCE ALL LIFE IS LIVED DAY BY DAY, IT IS DIFFICULT TO HAVE A CLEAR AND SYSTEMATIC CIEW OF THE FUTURE. THOSE INVOLVED, THEREFORE , CAN ONLY HOPE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGERS EFFORTS WILL SUCCEED. DE STAERCKE URGED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ALLIANCE ITSELF HAD NO FORMAL POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST, A "POLICY OF ALLIES" MUST CONVERGE IN SUPPORT OF US EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WHILE THE ALLIANCE MAY NOT

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HAVE ITS OWN DISTINCT MIDDLE EAS POLICY, DANGERS EXIST FOR IT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SHOULD PROMPT "US ALL" TO ACT AS ALLIES SO THAT THE US WILL KNOW THAT ITS EFFORTS HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ITS ATLANTIC PARTNERS.

27. REFERRING TO ASSISTNAT SECRETARY ATHERTONS REMARKS, DE STAERCKE AGREED THAT THE SITUATION WAS RENDERED MORE COMPLEX THE RABAT SUMMIT AND THE UN DEBATE ON PALESTINE. HE ALSO NOTED ATHERTONS ASSESSMENT T AT A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDED BOTH ON THE CLARITY OF ARAB SIGNALS ABOUT THE CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL

AND ON RENEWAL OF THE UNDOF MANDATE. WITH REGARD TO THE CONTINUING SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL AND THE FORTHCOMING UN VOTE ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE, IT SEEMS TO THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE RESOLUTION AS DRAFTED IS NOT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO PLACE ISRAELS CONTINUING EXISTENCE IN QUESTION. ACCORDINGLY, HOW SHOULD THE ALLIES REACT--CAN THE RESOLUTION BE AMENDED OR SEETENED? AND, IF NOT, WHAT CONSEQUENCES WOULD RESULT AND WHAT FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED?

28. CONCERNING THE SOVIET ROLE AND ATTITUDES, DE STAERCKE HOPED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING WOULD OFFER SOME INDICATORS. NOTING THE SOVIETS INTEREST IN RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, DE STAERCKE WONDERED WHETHER SETTLEMENT MIGHT BETER BE SOUGHT IN THAT FORUM OR IN BILATERAL EFFORTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY. DE STAERCKE AGREED THAT A SETTLEMENT OF THE JERUSALEM QUESTION WAS VITAL, BUT BELIEVED THAT IF THE

STEP BY STEP APPROACH BROUGHT SUCCESS IN RESOLVING OTHER  
ISSUES, PERHAPS IT WILL ALSO SUCCEED IN ULTIMATELY  
SOLVING THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM.

29. SYG LUNS ECHOED DE STAERCKES APPEAL FOR THE ALLIES TO  
ADOPT CLEAR CUT ATTITUDES ON THE PALESTINE RESOLUTION IN THE  
UN. HE ALSO NOTED THE DIFFICULTY IN RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS IF  
ISRAEL FEELS

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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